Based on a case study of copper interconnect technology, I propose three kinds of absorptive capacity exist: disciplinary, domain-specific and encoded. Each depends upon distinct mechanisms and organizational tradeoffs. Absorbing disciplinary research requires a firm to actively contribute to the scientific community, while protecting its domain-specific knowledge. Absorbing domain-specific knowledge requires the firm to influence the external environment to produce such knowledge, and to hire people who possess it. Absorbing encoded knowledge requires close ties with partners to internalize bundles of routines from them. Both a firm's internal R&D and its social networks play interrelated roles in building absorptive capacity.
Introduction
Knowledge spillovers are important to the productivity of firms (Jaffe, 1986) and to economic growth (Griliches, 1992; Romer, 1990) . Cohen and Levinthal (1990) propose that a firm must make internal investments -particularly in R&D -to improve its ability to absorb knowledge spillovers. This notion of "absorptive capacity" is an important theoretical contribution that has gained considerable influence (Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2002) . However, many questions remain unanswered. Are there different kinds of absorptive capacity? When is internal R&D important for absorptive capacity, and when are alternative mechanisms more effective?
In this paper, I propose that three different forms of absorptive capacity exist: disciplinary, domain-specific and encoded. They allow a firm to capture different knowledge types, respectively: general scientific knowledge, solutions to specific technical problems, and knowledge embedded in tools and processes. Disciplinary and domain-specific absorptive capacity are needed during the early stages of R&D, while encoded absorptive capacity is applicable at a later stage. Each relies on distinct mechanisms for knowledge absorption. Over time, firms may rely on one or more of these approaches, but it is difficult for a firm to develop disciplinary and domain-specific absorptive capacity simultaneously, as these depend upon divergent organizational practices and incentives.
The basis for this formulation of absorptive capacity is a case study on copper interconnect technology for semiconductor chips. These interconnects refer to the conductors through which electricity flows between various circuit elements on a semiconductor chip.
The use of copper instead of aluminum for on-chip interconnects is a recent innovation of great importance. Features of this technology offer a rare glimpse into how firms developed different kinds of absorptive capacity and how they attempted to capture spillovers.
The main contribution of this paper is in opening up the black box of absorptive capacity, offering an inside view of how a firm's prior R&D and social networks interrelate in developing absorptive capacity. In so doing, it helps to clarify the nature and mechanisms underlying this important theoretical concept. It also relates different kinds of absorptive capacity to organizational capabilities. While the distinction between basic and applied research has been known for a long time, this paper identifies how they map into the firm's ability to absorb different kinds of knowledge.
The next section of this paper reviews prior research on absorptive capacity and proposes the existence of three distinct types. Section 3 describes the research setting and methodology.
Section 4 traces the development of copper technology to illustrate the three kinds of absorptive capacity in action. Section 5 discusses the roles played by a firm's prior R&D and social networks in developing absorptive capacity. Section 6 draws conclusions. Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) characterized knowledge as having the features of a durable public good. The knowledge produced through the R&D of an innovator is easily "borrowed" by another party, without compensating the former. The innovator cannot appropriate the marginal value of the knowledge it produces and therefore under-invests in its production, relative to the social optimum.
Knowledge Spillovers and Absorptive Capacity
Departing from the view that knowledge spillovers are easily acquired, Cohen & Levinthal (1989 , 1990 propose that knowledge spillovers come at a cost to the recipient.
Firms must invest resources in order to absorb knowledge spillovers. Cohen and Levinthal note that various mechanisms exist for building absorptive capacity. However, the one they primarily emphasize is prior related R&D. According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 135) this relationship between R&D and absorptive capacity arises because knowledge is hard to codify (or tacit) and embedded in the routines of the organization. From this perspective, R&D has two "faces": it increases a firm's productivity and its absorptive capacity.
There is considerable support for the concept of absorptive capacity. Jaffe (1986: 993) found that the interaction between a firm's R&D expenditure and spillovers is strongly correlated with the firm's performance. Additional evidence is offered by Gambardella (1992) , Henderson and Cockburn (1996) , Arora and Gambardella (1992) and Zucker and Darby (1995) . Absorptive capacity has made a significant impact on theoretical research, with scholars using it as a building block to understand knowledge flows (Szulanski, 1996; von Krogh and Roos, 1996; Reagans and McEvily, 2003) , strategic alliances (Ahuja and Katila, 2001 ) and other areas (see Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2002 , for a review).
Despite its growing importance as a conceptual building block, there has been little theoretical development concerning absorptive capacity itself. Zahra and George (2000) raise concerns about the weak assumptions and inconsistent definitions underpinning the concept of absorptive capacity. While surveying of two decades of research in this area, Lane, Koka and Pathak (2002) point out that the literature has placed "little attention to the actual processes underlying absorptive capacity". There have been notable exceptions. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) propose the concept of "relative absorptive capacity", in which the efficiency of knowledge absorption between two firms depends upon their degree of similarity and familiarity with one another's practices. Van den Bosch, Volberda and de Boer (1999) suggest a co-evolutionary framework, providing valuable insights into how absorptive capacity varies according to environmental stability and organization forms. But apart from these studies, we know surprisingly little about what constitutes absorptive capacity and how it actually functions.
Another set of issues surround the role of social ties in building absorptive capacity. A number of authors have shown that a firm's connectedness to external sources of public and private knowledge can help it to build absorptive capacity (Zucker and Darby, 1995; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996) . But exactly how does this fit into the framework presented by Cohen and Levinthal? Is a firm's R&D a means by which to gain membership into a network of knowledge? Or is it a substitute that reduces a firm's need to invest in R&D?
The main factor impeding theoretical research in this area is that absorptive capacity is frustratingly difficult to observe. How indeed does one observe a firm in the process of absorbing external knowledge, let alone account for it stock of "prior relevant research"? Hence, extant theories are often based on deductive rather than inductive logic. Even in empirical studies, absorptive capacity is often not observed directly, but assumed to increase with coauthoring behavior, labor mobility, and R&D investment. Because the actual flow of ideas is often hard to trace, it is difficult to separate the "two faces of R&D". Thus, in most studies, it remains unclear whether successful firms were better at capturing spillovers, or whether they were simply more productive at R&D than their rivals. This paper attempts to clarify these theoretical issues by examining a particular technology for which it is possible to account for knowledge flows, including each firm's attempts at prior R&D and social networking. As discussed in Section 3 below, this hinges crucially upon features of the technology itself, as well as the combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques employed.
Using this approach, I propose the existence of three different types of absorptive capacity: disciplinary, domain-specific and encoded. Disciplinary absorptive capacity involves acquiring raw scientific knowledge in key scientific disciplines, and converting that knowledge into a form that is useful for solving practical problems. Domain-specific absorptive capacity refers to the ability to acquire knowledge directly related to solving those problems, so as to produce commercially useful innovations. Finally, "encoded" absorptive capacity refers to a firm's ability to absorb knowledge that is already embedded in tools, artifacts and processes. Domain-specific and disciplinary absorptive capacity are relevant in the early stages of a technology when much of it is tacit and uncertain, whereas encoded absorptive capacity is more important at a later stage. This is consistent with the evolutionary approach suggested by Van den Bosch, Volberda and de Boer (1999) .
I hypothesize that each type of absorptive capacity relies upon different mechanisms.
To build disciplinary absorptive capacity, a firm must hire scientists who are trained in various scientific disciplines and offer them the autonomy to explore possible solutions. The firm has to establish credibility within the academic community (Zucker and Darby, 1995) and actively publish in scientific fields (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998) . By comparison, domain-specific knowledge depends upon a combination of mechanisms, including funding R&D at universities, hiring graduate students from those projects, building strong ties with R&D consortia, and hiring individuals possessing domain-specific skills from other firms (especially those investing in disciplinary knowledge). In order to absorb domain-specific knowledge, a firm does not have to perform as much internal R&D as for disciplinary knowledge, however the R&D that it performs has to be focused. This helps improve the efficiency of knowledge transfer (Lane and Lubatkin, 1989) . Such "tuning" is less crucial when absorbing disciplinary knowledge, which is usually of a more general form. As for encoded knowledge, it relies on the emergence of a "market for ideas" (Gans and Stern, 2003) , for example, the firm may acquire knowledge from suppliers and alliance partners that possess that knowledge and have an incentive to profit from disseminating it.
Although both disciplinary and domain-specific absorptive capacity are relevant in early-stage exploration, it is difficult for a firm to develop both types simultaneously. This is because the production of scientific knowledge and domain-specific knowledge depend upon different -and sometimes conflicting -organizational practices (Stern, 2004; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003) . Disciplinary absorptive capacity is a costly affair, perhaps affordable only to firms such as IBM, AT&T and Merck. Laboratories need to be built and filled with special equipment to attract scientists. The organization has to hire and retain scholars, which requires the formation of a conducive internal research environment (Stern, 2004) . Long gestation periods are required for the knowledge created to become useful products. In order to recoup the high cost of participating in science, the firm has to be very careful about protecting the domain-specific knowledge it creates, either through defensible patent positions or through secrecy. At the same time, it has to remain selectively open about the general scientific ideas that it generates, in order to remain connected to the scientific community. Domain-specific absorptive capacity requires a different set of skills for acquiring solution-specific skills from universities, R&D consortia and discipline-oriented firms. In a sense, the problem isn't really about the tacitness of knowledge per-se; after all, it is possible to hire people in whose heads lies the tacit knowledge. The real problem is the scarcity of such talent. Hence, the firm may need to actively nurture external talent (such as by research at universities and consortia) and funnel that talent into the firm through targeted recruitment efforts. In order to spot such talent and bring it in-house ahead of rivals, a firm may need to take leadership positions at R&D consortia, work closely with universities and form strategic relationships with disciplinary firms.
From the above, it should be apparent that investing in domain-specific absorptive capacity is not costless. It involves expending precious management attention and resources on cultivating external ties. Domain-specific absorptive capacity may also require direct expenditures to fund research at universities and R&D consortia. Since the company is not contributing directly to the formation of disciplinary knowledge, one might think of this as a membership fee into the network. Apart from these costs, the firm faces a loss of control over upstream research, as compared to performing it in-house (Aghion and Tirole, 1994) .
Nonetheless, domain-specific absorptive capacity is probably less costly than disciplinary absorptive capacity. This means that the firm can afford to be a little more generous in sharing its knowledge with allies and suppliers.
Encoded absorptive capacity is useful for late-stage entrants. Such firms do not have the luxury of waiting for a scientific discovery to bear fruit, and are mainly interested in using the technical solution already worked out. They seek to acquire knowledge that has been codified by others into portable tools and routines. This may take the form of licensing the technology, forming strategic alliances, and working closely with suppliers. However, effort is needed to ensure that the bundles of routines purchased are carefully integrated into the firm's existing operations. In this case, absorptive capacity mainly involves working closely with the sources of knowledge to assimilate it, and recombining the firm's capabilities where necessary (Kogut and Zander, 1992) . As time passes, an increasing amount of the technology diffuses and it becomes "common knowledge". Hence, the knowledge becomes easier to absorb (Reagans and McEvily, 2003) , and the need to work intimately with knowledge suppliers declines.
In section 3 and 4 below, I introduce a case study that illustrates these three kinds of absorptive capacity in action. Then, in Section 5, I discuss how a firm's prior R&D and social networks play interrelated roles in building absorptive capacity, sometimes acting as complements and sometimes as substitutes. This helps to reconcile the findings of various studies on absorptive capacity, which have variously emphasized 'connectedness' to public science (Henderson and Cockburn, 1998) , recruiting star scientists (Zucker and Darby, 1995) ,
and fostering an open, academic-style R&D environment (Gambardella, 1992) .
Data and Research Methods
I conducted an in-depth case study to trace knowledge spillovers of an important semiconductor technology: copper interconnects. The semiconductor industry is a major one, with shipments worth $166 billion in 2003.
1 Knowledge spillovers are pervasive in this industry (Mowery, 1983; Appleyard, 1996) . Much of this knowledge is tacit and deeply embedded in organizational processes. Designing and manufacturing a semiconductor chip involves a great deal of judgment that is difficult to codify. The manufacturing process itself is horrendously complex and requires almost perfect coordination among hundreds of intricate and interrelated steps, each subject to variability from human operators and minor details in the manner and sequence in which it is performed. In short, the semiconductor industry depends upon complex, embedded knowledge. These are the conditions under which prior relevant R&D should enhance absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques
In this paper, a case study approach was chosen. This allows me to trace specific ideas that various firms "borrowed" from other sources. Spillovers are by nature difficult to observe, so large-scale empirical studies often have to infer that spillovers actually occurred. By tracing the flow of ideas in a case study, I offer an "inside-the-black-box" view of spillovers, instead of assuming that they occurred.
This study combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches. This helps to overcome the limitations inherent in each approach (Yin, 1994) . The quantitative analysis is based on a dataset of patents and publications relevant to copper interconnect technology (see the Appendix). Data on publications were obtained from the Science Citation Index (SCI) and data on patents from the U.S. Patent Office. The dataset contains 413 relevant articles (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) and 216 U.S. Patents (1976 Patents ( -1999 . The definition of a "relevant" set is necessary because copper has many other uses within and outside the semiconductor industry. Relevant patents and publications were chosen based upon a specific set of skills (defined below) that would have helped a firm to absorb copper interconnect technology.
I approximated each firm's level of prior relevant R&D using the number of patents and publications it produced. This data is subject to bias, as not all research results are published or patented (some firms may choose to keep them secret). Also, papers may not meet the standards for publication and patent applications may be rejected. Another issue is that the coverage of the Science Citation Index, while excellent, is incomplete. However, the SCI is the best available source, because other bibliographical databases contain only the address of the first author.
I traced knowledge flows using patent-to-patent and patent-to-science citations (the dataset contains all cited patents awarded after 1960, as well as all the scientific publications cited by the copper patents of four leading companies). Citation analysis has long been used to measure knowledge spillovers across organizations (e.g., Martin and Irvin, 1983; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993; Ahuja, 2000) . Patent-to-patent citations indicate spillovers of technological knowledge, while patent-to-science citations indicate spillovers from scientific fields (Narin, Kimberly and Olivastro, 1997) .
There are some well-known limitations of patent citation analysis. Not all the citations in a patent are placed there by the inventor(s). An unspecified number are introduced by patent examiners while checking the originality of the invention (Collins and Wyatt, 1988, p. 66) . Thus, one cannot determine conclusively from patent citations alone whether the initial inventors actually relied upon the knowledge cited.
In order to overcome the issues discussed above, this study makes use of extensive qualitative analysis. I conducted semi-structured interviews with around two dozen scientists, also analyzed more than 300 related articles from technical journals, newspapers, and trade journals.
Identifying Prior Relevant R&D
Several features of copper interconnect technology make it suitable for this study.
The spillovers occurred from relatively few sources, making them possible to track.
Moreover, the trail of evidence was still fresh when I began this project in 1997. 4 But, the most important factor is that it depends upon a novel set of competencies that are distinct from the ones needed for aluminum interconnects. This makes it feasible to identify the "relevant prior experience" of each firm.
One of the major problems with using copper as an interconnect material is that copper is difficult to etch using plasma gases. 5 As such, it is difficult to use the traditional process, in which a layer of aluminum is placed onto the semiconductor chip and the unwanted portions etched away. To solve this problem, IBM developed a technique known as the damascene process, in which the required pattern is etched onto the underlying material, after which copper is deposited onto that surface. As such, the damascene process reverses the steps used in the traditional process.
IBM invented the damascene process in the early 1980s, using aluminum. Formidable technical obstacles had to be overcome before copper could be used instead. First, unlike with aluminum, copper has the propensity to contaminate silicon, destroying the very circuitry it is meant to interconnect. This requires that a special barrier layer be placed between the two materials. The risk of contamination also has organizational implications: it requires careful handling on a production line so as not to contaminate the equipment being used and other wafers being processed. Organizational processes and the production flow must be modified to accommodate copper. Some companies consider the risk of copper contamination so great that they build entirely new fabrication plants for copper.
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The second, and perhaps most difficult, technical challenge is how to deposit a uniform layer of copper onto the uneven structures beneath. These structures are deep and narrow, especially the sections connecting vertical layers together. For a long time, researchers struggled to identify a way to deposit copper into these structures without forming air bubbles and imperfections inside. They explored four options: chemical vapor deposition 5 To learn more about the technical details, see Gutmann (1999) , and Liu, Pai and Martinez (1999) . (CVD), physical vapor deposition (PVD), electroless deposition, and electroplating. 7 While the standard aluminum process uses PVD, copper interconnects use PVD only for the barrier and seed layers, and electroplating for depositing the interconnect layer. The use of electroplating was highly counterintuitive at first, as it requires the delicate silicon wafers (which are manufactured in ultra-clean environments) to be dipped into "dirty" electroplating solutions.
A third technical obstacle arose because copper is a soft metal, making it difficult to polish each layer into a flat surface upon which to build the next layer. To do so, IBM developed a process known as Chemical-Mechanical-Planarization (CMP), in which a rotating disk coated with slurry (a mix of chemicals) is used to polish the surface. As with electroplating, CMP was a highly counterintuitive idea when first proposed. People were opposed to dunking their precious silicon wafers into a cocktail of powerful chemicals while grinding them flat. Moreover, the process is extremely difficult to control, and even today remains somewhat of an art.
Once the copper is deposited and polished flat, a final obstacle remains: unlike aluminum, which forms a natural protective coating, copper oxidizes when it is exposed to air. Hence, copper interconnects require a passivation layer to protect against corrosion.
Because of these technical difficulties, aluminum has been used instead of copper throughout the history of the semiconductor industry. These difficulties point to the technical skills that would have helped adoption. They include prior R&D on: (1) copper deposition techniques -CVD, PVD, electroless, and electroplating; (2) copper damascene process; (3) 7 CVD involves suspending copper in a chemical vapor, which then produces a coating of copper on the semiconductor wafer. PVD involves bombarding the target surface with copper atoms that gradually form a layer. Electroplating involves immersing a surface into an electrolytic solution and running an electric current through two electrodes (one of which is the desired pattern on the surface), thereby accumulating copper on one electrode. Electroless deposition is similar to electroplating, but depends on a chemical reaction rather than requiring electrodes.
copper CMP; (4) barrier layers for copper; and (5) passivation layer for copper. Using qualitative and quantitative approaches, I identified each firm's prior R&D in these areas and how it shaped the firm's absorptive capacity.
The Copper Interconnect Puzzle
The pattern of R&D on copper interconnects and its adoption by various firms reveals an interesting puzzle (see Table 1 ). IBM pioneered much of the early research on copper interconnects and became the first company to ship copper-based products. This is consistent with the idea that IBM's prior research helped it to acquire the knowledge needed to create copper interconnects ahead of other firms.
However, two surprising facts emerge. First, a very short amount of time elapsed between IBM shipping its first product and other firms (Motorola, TSMC, UMC, VLSI and AMD) shipping their products. In fact, Motorola and Texas Instruments announced their own copper interconnect technologies just weeks after IBM's announcement. Within a year of IBM, four other companies were also shipping copper-based products. These firms had published far fewer research papers than IBM on the subject. Could they have perhaps relied on something other than prior research to absorb knowledge from IBM and elsewhere?
The second interesting fact is that several late entrants (including UMC and TSMC) were quick to ship their copper products relative to firms that had published a greater number of research articles on that topic. Astonishingly, TSMC, UMC and VLSI began shipping copperbased products only two years after they began R&D, much shorter than most other firms.
Perhaps these firms had developed yet another form of absorptive capacity?
In the remainder of this section, I analyze this puzzle using the following logic:
• I first provide evidence that firms depended on knowledge spillovers, primarily from IBM (Section 4.1). This rules out the alternative explanation that they did not rely on spillovers, but were simply more productive at R&D than IBM. It also rules out the possibility that copper interconnects are based on 'obvious' technological solutions that other firms developed independently.
• Having established that firms depended upon spillovers, I examine the prior R&D activity of each firm (Section 4.2). I show that early adopters such as Motorola absorbed external knowledge through a combination of internal R&D and "connectedness" to external knowledge sources. However, the nature of their absorptive capacity is quite unlike that of IBM.
• Finally, I explore knowledge flows after IBM's announcement in 1997 (Section 4.3).
By then, absorptive capacity depended mainly on relationships with companies that already possessed that technology. Prior relevant R&D was less important at this stage than working closely with suppliers.
Firms Depended On External Knowledge, Primarily from IBM
It is tempting to believe that the other firms did not depend on external knowledge, and therefore did not perform much R&D because they had no need for absorptive capacity.
Perhaps they were simply more productive at internal R&D than IBM? Or perhaps they independently invented copper interconnect technology? Neither of these explanations is persuasive. Although other firms performed relatively little research, they depended heavily upon external knowledge from IBM, universities, and research consortia. IBM was the single most important source. The most compelling evidence of IBM's importance is that all commercial copper processes to date use the damascene process developed by IBM, and they deposit the copper using electroplating.
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As noted above, damascene electroplating involves process steps that were not intuitive at the time of its invention, including reversing the sequence of steps from the traditional etch 8
The ubiquity of this technique is apparent from industry interviews, news reports, and descriptions in the patents of various companies. For example see Proc. IEEE IEDM Conference (1997).
process and immersing the semiconductor wafers into "dirty" solutions. This makes it highly unlikely that all the firms independently and simultaneously developed the same process. In retrospect, other companies could have pursued alternative metals and alloys. But even had they chosen copper, they might have developed something other than the damascene process, and could certainly have deposited copper some other way (e.g., PVD, CVD, or electroless deposition).
The knowledge dependence on IBM is consistent with the patent citation analysis. As shown in Table 2 , the patents on copper interconnects by Motorola, TI, AMD, and other firms include a large number of citations to IBM patents. In aggregate, patents for copper interconnects make 265 citations to IBM patents, almost four times more than any other source. Similar results are obtained if we consider only citations to patents directly related to copper interconnect technology (Table 3) . The results also remain robust if self-citations are eliminated, as shown in the last row of each Table. It is interesting that two early adopters, Motorola and AMD, make as many citations to IBM patents as to their own, while Texas
Instruments cites IBM patents even more than its own. The only firm that did not exhibit knowledge dependence on IBM in the patent-to-patent citations is AT&T, which had access to the bountiful resources of Bell Laboratories. According to interviews, AT&T was selfsufficient in performing in-house disciplinary research on copper technology.
Another interesting result from Tables 2 and 3 is the strong knowledge dependence on Motorola, which received the second-highest number of citations. As is discussed below, Motorola relied heavily on knowledge spillovers from IBM, and then played a major role in disseminating this technology to other companies.
The knowledge dependence of other firms on IBM existed even though IBM relied heavily on secrecy to protect its technology. IBM was so successful at keeping the project under wraps that many industry experts were surprised when the company made the official announcement in 1997. 9 Publications emerged from IBM on the general ideas relating to the damascene process and copper technology, but process-specific knowledge was kept carefully hidden.
Copper research was deemed a top commercial priority at IBM. According to one IBM employee, the firm's researchers were "rewarded internally through other means" (financially and through promotions) rather than given permission to publish their more sensitive IBM's secrecy makes the results in Tables 2 and 3 even more remarkable. By choosing secrecy, IBM withheld from patenting aggressively until the mid-1990s (see Table 6 ).
Therefore, the data in Tables 2 and 3 are made by copper patents to the scientific literature. As Table 4 shows, IBM is the single largest source of publications cited by the copper patents of Motorola, AMD, and Applied Materials (the world's largest semiconductor equipment supplier).
Table 4 also shows that the copper patents by these companies make a large number of citations to research published by universities and government laboratories. As discussed below, these laboratories and universities were important sources of knowledge for companies other than IBM. Unfortunately, their importance is not reflected in the patent-to-patent citations of Tables 2 and 3 . Few universities and government laboratories filed for patents on copper interconnects (see Figure 1 ), although they published a large number of articles on the subject (see Figure 2 ).
Absorptive Capacity before 1997
I now turn to the prior relevant R&D of each firm. Published accounts and interviews with IBM researchers show that IBM began researching copper interconnects in the 1960s.
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By the early 1980s, the company had invented the damascene process and CMP. Tables 5 and 6) , and grew at a rapid rate (see Figures 1 and 2 ). Academic research also began to emerge at this time (Figure 2 ).
Several factors contributed to this expansion of research. There was a growing realization that the industry would not be able to cope with future needs using aluminum. In addition, IBM -although tight-lipped about the details -began to reveal that it was making progress with copper. Momentum grew as technological breakthroughs began to appear from non-IBM researchers. Many of the researchers I interviewed described the emergence of a critical mass of people working on copper, and how this legitimized their own research and their requests for funding.
Intel's effort is noteworthy among the early explorers. In 1989, Intel researchers published an article on copper interconnects using electroless deposition (Pai and Ting, 1989 Table 7 shows that publications began appearing from these universities around 1990. Universities in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan also began to publish articles on copper interconnects, but the Sematech-backed universities led by quite a margin (Table 7) .
Researchers at universities and Sematech officials acknowledge that, during this period, they were "rediscovering" what IBM already knew. A handful of university researchers who attempted to etch copper quickly abandoned the process, and instead began to explore the damascene process. Much of this was directed at copper CVD, driven by IBM's 1989 demonstration of its copper CVD chip (note that by then, IBM had already moved on to electroplating). This pattern of research shows that universities were, in fact, borrowing IBM's ideas. The important difference was that now, it was in the public domain.
At Cornell University, an important Sematech-funded project generated data that helped firms realize that electroplating was more feasible than electroless plating. The research produced, among others, three patents jointly assigned to Cornell, Sematech, and
Intel. 13 Interestingly, the inventors of these patents included one researcher originally from IBM, and who had subsequently moved to Intel. This is surely an indication that the knowledge created at IBM was transmitted to other firms via Sematech.
The key mechanism by which Motorola and other firms absorbed the knowledge created through the Sematech program was by recruiting graduate students working on those programs. Academic researchers reported strong demand for graduates with such experience.
One professor mentioned how a graduate student had done a less-than-"marketable" Ph.D., stayed on for post-doctoral research on copper interconnects, and was then snatched up by a company. The companies that recruited these students -unlike AT&T and IBM -were attempting to hire individuals with domain-specific skills. According to the R&D director at one company, "The people we hired from universities had the right set of skills. They were familiar with specific technical areas, such as plating, sputtering, etc.". Sematech member companies had an advantage in that regular meetings provided them with an opportunity to evaluate students they might recruit. According to one professor:
In most cases, graduate students went to U.S. industry -especially Sematech companies. This is because Sematech funded the research, and therefore people from Sematech companies were at the annual review, where they had early indications of the quality of the students.
Apart from funding public research, Sematech also performed a series of internal studies to develop copper-capable equipment in conjunction with suppliers ( The norm in the semiconductor industry is for employees who leave one firm to join another to work on unrelated projects for at least 6-9 months.
progress on copper technology. According to a Motorola employee, the company "operated in tactical mode" to integrate external knowledge with its own talent. They weren't out to explore the discipline (as reflected in the low publication counts), but organized teams to patent a large number of processes useful for solving the copper problem (Table 6) Table 3 shows that citations of Motorola's copper patents rank second only to those of IBM. And Table 8 shows that the most highly cited patent on copper interconnect technology belongs not to IBM, but to Motorola.
Disciplinary Knowledge and Absorptive Capacity
In contrast to other companies and in line with its efforts to preserve secrecy, IBM's efforts depended very much on internal knowledge. As Tables 2 and 3 show, IBM's copper patents cite the company's own patents more than they cite patents from any other organization. Likewise, the citations made by IBM patents to the scientific literature make the largest number of references to articles published by IBM (see Table 4 ). This is unsurprising, since IBM's Watson Laboratories did much of the fundamental research on copper interconnects. There was no need to go outside to acquire such knowledge, and in any case IBM was ahead of everyone else in the field. Two of the main contributors to Sematech's efforts were RPI and SUNY Albany (Table 7) . IBM, itself a member of Sematech and in close geographic proximity to these universities, kept track of and even encouraged this research.
However, there was no direct transfer of knowledge from IBM to the universities, apart from papers IBM published in journals and presented at conferences. According to researchers interviewed, IBM's perspective was that although it was ahead in copper R&D, it had nothing to lose by monitoring others.
If IBM depended at all on external knowledge, it was at a broad, disciplinary level, rather than for knowledge specific to copper interconnect technology. Interviewees at IBM emphasized the company's primary policy of recruiting top-notch researchers directly from graduate programs and allowing them to pursue interesting problems at IBM, rather than hiring people with domain-specific knowledge. In fact, IBM's Watson Laboratories has never hired anyone to work on its copper R&D who had previously worked on copper at other firms, or had written a Ph.D. thesis on the topic. Instead, the IBM employees who created the damascene process and CMP technology were specialists in fundamental areas:
electrochemists familiar with electrodeposition, a physicist who developed the barrier layer, and materials scientists who understood corrosion and device-failure.
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The team did not include people who had worked on aluminum-copper interconnects, which is not directly related. This further supports the point that copper depended upon different skills.
Absorptive Capacity After 1997
IBM's 1997 announcement of its copper technology triggered a race among other firms to offer copper technology as well (Lineback, 1998) . This contest radically changed the dynamics of knowledge-flow. Firms could no longer rely on the relatively slow process of converting domain or disciplinary knowledge into a commercial product. Besides, some companies had already done so, including Motorola and the equipment vendors. Alliances and joint ventures formed rapidly between firms that wanted the technology and firms with the expertise (see Tables 9, 10 ). It is interesting that no alliances existed prior to 1998, underscoring the fact that the dynamics had shifted. Even IBM became less secretive and began to seek ways to license or trade its technology. Third-party information traders also materialized, such as a company that began selling reverse-engineering reports of IBM's copper-based chips almost as soon as they were shipped.
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It is important to distinguish the relationships that involved "borrowed" ideas from those that simply reflect inputs purchased below their actual costs (Griliches, 1992) . The alliances involving IBM probably should not be viewed as true spillovers, since IBM must have expected reciprocal benefits. Neither should the manufacturing alliances (e.g., Sun and TI). However, technology-sharing alliances that did not involve IBM should be considered spillovers from IBM's perspective (even though they are not externalities among the alliance partners). For example, the alliance between Motorola and AMD did not involve payments by either party to IBM. 17 As for the equipment suppliers, IBM receives an unspecified royalty from Novellus with whom it jointly developed tools. However, IBM receives no royalties from the other equipment suppliers, including Applied Materials, Semitool, and Cutek. Many 16 "ICE Corp. is excited to announce the immediate availability of a construction analysis report on the recently announced IBM PowerPC 750 … This report represents one of the most detailed reports ICE has ever produced …" (Source: ICE website).
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Semiconductor companies often trade patent portfolios (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) . IBM may be able to appropriate some benefit through such ex-post bargaining, but it is difficult to monitor and implement such deals. Moreover, other firms now have many patents, including Motorola, AMD, and TI (see Table 6 ), and therefore hold strong bargaining positions against IBM.
interviewees reported that equipment vendors act as conduits through which much more information flows than is embodied in the tools they sell. Hence, it is reasonable to consider knowledge flows from equipment vendors as externalities.
Perhaps the most viable of the alliances formed after 1997 was that between AMD and Motorola. AMD's copper program began around 1995 and grew very rapidly. However, the firm needed to accelerate its effort to compete with Intel. So, AMD signed a major agreement in July 1998 to trade its flash memory technology for Motorola's copper interconnect technology. Motorola's technology formed the basis for AMD's state-of-the-art facility in Germany, and in which Motorola eventually took an equity stake.
Two Taiwanese companies (TSMC and UMC) and an American one (VLSI Technologies) adopted copper interconnect technology with the greatest speed. Both TSMC and UMC began copper R&D programs in mid-1998 and, at the end of 1999, shipped IC chips with the top two metal layers made from copper. According to my interviews, TSMC, UMC and VLSI depended primarily on technical knowledge from equipment suppliers.
TSMC worked closely with Applied Materials, while UMC was one of first customers of Novellus (which had jointly developed tools with IBM).
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There are several other similarities between TSMC and UMC. Both recruited highly trained personnel, including people who received their graduate-level education at top universities in Taiwan and the United States; some had also worked at U.S. companies. Yet, interviewees at both firms did not perceive a direct relationship between university research and their copper projects. One interviewee characterized university research as being 18 In January 2000, UMC joined an alliance with IBM Microelectronics and Infineon (Siemens) to co-develop process technology (including copper) for 0.13 micron chips. However, this was after UMC had developed in-house capabilities and shipped copper products by the end of 1999.
in the literature [and] available for years. It's helpful, but they are pure research -basic, fundamental studies. But to make things work is really different [sic] .
Another interesting similarity is that while the copper development teams at both companies had highly talented people, they did not include individuals with extensive prior experience with copper interconnects. Because much of the technical knowledge came from equipment suppliers, the primary role of internal teams was to integrate the knowledge of suppliers into manufacturing processes. Thus while these companies were able to absorb the knowledge for using copper technology, they were not building knowledge about copper at a deeper level.
TSMC, UMC and VLSI are only the first in a larger wave of companies that depend primarily on equipment vendors. The role of equipment suppliers is not an easy one. Each piece of equipment is only a small part of the overall puzzle of putting together a copper process. To fill the void in their knowledge, equipment companies have coalesced into alliances that provide complete solutions. The first such alliance was created in 1998 by Novellus, Lam Research, IPEC, and Ontrak (see Table 10 ). It was followed by another alliance led by Semitool. The exception to this pattern of alliances is Applied Materials, which is a very large firm. In 1998, it began offering an integrated set of tools for copper interconnects and opened a service center where customers can "test-drive" this technology.
As a result of the work by equipment companies, much of the technical knowledge had become "unstuck" (von Hippel, 1994) by the end of 1999. Adoption has since begun to depend on other issues, such as how to organize a facility to avoid copper contamination and whether to invest in a new facility or deploy copper technology into an existing facility.
Discussion
At one level, the story presented above is consistent with stylized notions of absorptive capacity. IBM performed a great deal of R&D, and this "prior relevant research" helped it to absorb knowledge faster than anyone else. But a closer look reveals the existence of different types of absorptive capacity. IBM (and AT&T) almost exclusively absorbed disciplinary knowledge. Other early adopters used their social networks to shape the external scientific environment in their favor, and tuned their internal R&D efforts towards absorbing domainspecific knowledge, not broad disciplinary knowledge. At a later stage, R&D played a secondary role as knowledge became encoded in tools and processes, so that adoption hinged upon having strong relationships with other firms already possessing that knowledge.
For each type of absorptive capacity, social networks play a slightly different role. For disciplinary knowledge, being an active participant gives the firms direct access into the scientific community and helps it to monitor for breakthroughs. In this case, IBM and AT&T scientists were full members of the invisible college, publishing a significant number of important research papers on copper technology. In fact, between 1987 and 1997, IBM published 40 papers on copper technology (Table 5) . This is twice the number produced by RPI, which had the highest research output among universities in this area (Table 7) . While speaking to IBM researchers during interviews, I clearly sensed their pride at being scientists.
Firms like IBM and AT&T closely resemble the biopharmaceutical firms studied by Cockburn and Henderson (1998) and Zucker and Darby (1995) . Such firms establish 'connectedness' to the upstream research community, and reward their scientists for collaborating with academics and publishing their research.
However, the heavy cost of participating in scientific exploration creates a strong incentive for the firm to be guarded and closed with its downstream partners, such as suppliers and alliance partners. Quite simply, the more of that knowledge leaks out, the harder it is to recoup the initial investment (Nelson, 1962 "IBM shared information that didn't fall into their crown jewel capability." Nonetheless, it is extraordinarily difficult to prevent spillovers from happening (Griliches, 1992) . Inevitably, the research from IBM spilled out and acted as a focusing mechanism for the efforts of others (Rosenberg, 1969) . This accounts for why IBM was so secretive, and at the same time produced research papers that were so highly cited.
For domain specific absorptive capacity, social networks help the firm to recognize signals in the technological trajectory and to recruit talent. In this case, firms like Motorola took cues from the actions and plans they jointly made by IBM. Alliances with disciplineoriented firms, membership at R&D consortia and financial support for university research gave them priority access to potential hires with the needed domain expertise. An interesting aspect of this case is that it highlights the proactive efforts of such firms to shape public knowledge in their favor (in this case, by influencing the research agenda at Sematech and universities). Such firms have a strong incentive to co-evolve with their environment because they are highly dependent upon it for breakthroughs, unlike IBM which had little need or desire to go outside for domain knowledge. Besides, to remain a respected member of the scientific community, it is important for firms like IBM to avoid influencing public science directly.
Another aspect of domain-specific absorptive capacity is that the firm can take a much more open and friendly approach towards downstream partners. Building this form of absorptive capacity certainly takes a significant amount of managerial attention as well as direct monetary contributions (membership fees at consortia, salaries for assignees, funding research at universities). However, it is probably not of the order of magnitude that IBM invested in its 30-year copper program. As such, the firm has less of an incentive to hide its results than a disciplinary firm. As discussed earlier, firms like Motorola and Texas
Instruments were much more generous in sharing their knowledge with equipment suppliers and alliance partners than was IBM. They eventually developed into "strong ties" as a web of knowledge formed and expanded around them.
As for encoded absorptive capacity, social networks are less about technical knowledge per-se, but serve the purpose of acquiring organizational routines and processes that have been "unstuck" by others. Building encoded absorptive capacity requires having the right partner (as illustrated by the efforts of other firms to court Motorola). But in this case, equipment suppliers have put in an impressive amount of effort to make copper technology portable across firms. In doing so, they have turned it into common knowledge (Reagans and McEvily, 2003) , so that it is now easy for semiconductor firms to acquire. However, this kind of absorptive capacity raises concerns about sustainability, due to the high dependence on external sources of knowledge and the risk that the relationship might sour. In recent years and after I concluded my investigations, companies such as TSMC and UMC have began building domain-knowledge capabilities and increasing the number of their patents on copper technology.
Apart from role played by networks in building different kinds of absorptive capacity, there is a question of why disciplinary firms publish their work at all. After all, these publications provide clues for other firms to follow in their footsteps. According to interviews, if IBM hadn't allowed anything to be published at all, it would have had difficulty getting talented individuals to work on the project. Also, many innovations (e.g., damascene, CMP) were developed within IBM but outside the copper group. To keep everything under wraps probably would have required a firm-wide policy of non-publication. This would have dampened IBM's ability to build 'connectedness'. Finally, the emergence of publications by academics after 1989 acted as a catalyst. Had IBM not published its work, someone else would have done so. According to one professor, "With copper or damascene, when we publish something, IBM starts to publish also." This pattern of behavior could account for why IBM's publication rate increased in the 1990s, after universities and other firms also began to publish (see Table 5 ).
The discussion above helps us to clarify the role played by prior R&D and social networks in absorptive capacity. Firms use these mechanisms in specific and distinct ways for absorbing different kinds of knowledge. This helps us to understand how the literature on absorptive capacity highlighting the role of "openness" (Gambardella, 1992) fits in with that emphasizing the role of connectedness (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003) .
Conclusions
The case of copper interconnects offers a rare glimpse into the process of knowledge spillovers, one that is much talked about but seldom observed up close. The case shows that the mechanisms of absorptive capacity are more complex than the literature has suggested. I
propose that absorptive capacity is multi-faceted. At least three types exist, and they depend on distinct mechanisms and organizational competencies. This framework helps us understand the interconnected roles played by a firm's R&D investments and social networks in acquiring different kinds of knowledge. Social networks become increasingly important as the technology evolves, initially as a source of signals that help focus a firm's own efforts (Rosenberg, 1969) and later as a source of tangible knowledge in a market for ideas (Gans and Stern, 2003 ).
An important implication stems from the multifaceted nature of absorptive capacity.
In many studies, absorptive capacity is assumed to exist along one dimension, and is therefore high or low depending on a firm's cumulative R&D investment. This paper shows that one must be cautious about interpreting such figures in isolation. We should view a firm's effort to build absorptive capacity holistically, looking not just R&D figures but also its efforts to develop and maintain the relevant ties with suppliers, universities and research consortia. The efficiency of its efforts is likely to depend upon the kind of knowledge it is attempting to absorb, as well as the stage of technological evolution. Moreover, a firm can actively shape its external knowledge environment, so an evolutionary and dynamic view is necessary (Van den Bosch, Volberda and de Boer, 1999).
The tale of copper interconnects is a fascinating one. Rather than being viewed as a "test of the theory", I hope that readers will appreciate it as an attempt to integrate the existing literature and illustrate some new ideas, much like Nelson's (1962) study of the transistor.
There is a need for future research to explore whether the insights from this study hold outside the semiconductor industry. Further investigation is needed as well to better understand the various types of absorptive capacity and how a firm's dependence upon them changes with time. Research is also needed on the relationship between absorptive capacity and financial outcomes. If we want to confidently use the concept of absorptive capacity as a building block in organizational research, we need to know the answer to these questions. (1) Patents with titles and abstracts containing the keywords ("cu" or "copper") and "intercon*".
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(2) All patents with titles and abstracts containing the keyword "damascene."
(3) Patents in the two main semiconductor patent classes (257 and 438) containing the keyword "copper."
I downloaded these patents and manually identified those directly related to copper interconnects, based on each patent's title and abstract. 20 Where ambiguity arose, I consulted the "background" section of the patent, which describes the patent's purpose. I then downloaded the references made by these patents to other U.S. patents, performing this process twice to ensure that I obtained practically all the relevant patents. The final database contains 2440 patents, of which only 216 are directly related to copper interconnects. Most of the remaining patents are unrelated, since copper patents cited a large number of patents that weren't themselves about copper interconnects.
I identified the organization that owns each patent using its "assignee" field. I then generated a cross-reference of citations by patents on copper interconnects to all other U.S. When used in a search, an asterisk (*) acts as a wildcard that matches one or more characters.
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These are based on the "relevant" skills identified in the paper. My field interviews, attendance at technical conferences, and engineering background provided technical knowledge that was helpful in identifying patents and publications directly related to copper interconnect technology.
Library. 21 I then constructed a matrix showing the sources of scientific publications cited by each organization's patents.
Publications
I searched the Science Citation Index (SCI) for all scientific publications with titles containing ("Copper*" or "Cu"), and at least one of the following keywords: "intercon*", "metalliz*", "ULSI", "VLSI", "damascene", "etch", "planari*", "CMP", "barrier", "deposition", "PVD", "CVD".
The search produced 1017 publications between 1985 and 1997. I then manually identified those related directly to copper interconnect technology, based on their titles. Of the 1017 publications, only 502 were directly related to copper interconnects. I then eliminated all meeting abstracts, review articles, notes, and letters to obtain a final sample of 413 research articles.
I mapped each article to companies, universities, and R&D consortia based on the address field of its authors. The SCI records up to 255 authors per publication. Unfortunately, it does not indicate which authors are associated with each address. Thus, I adopt the following convention: for each distinct address listed in an article, I increment by one the number of articles published by that organization. The rationale is that each publication involves costly research plus the opportunity cost of writing and revising the paper. This approach counts articles that are co-authored among organizations multiple times, but this should not be a severe problem: only 32 articles in the sample were co-authored among organizations.
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With the exception of the SCI, these databases include only the affiliations of the first author. 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Year
No of Articles on Copper Interconnects
All Articles
Articles by University and Govt. Labs (2) Toshiba (1) Spectrum CVD (2) Taiwan Nat Chiao Tung U.
Articles by Firms
(1) Univ Uppsala, Sweden (2) Others (6) Notes:
• Patents included are for 1976-1999.
• Citations are to all scientific articles, regardless of date. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 
